Introduction
The Committee on External Economic Relations, the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on Institutional Affairs have been considering the way in which the European Parliament's role in shaping Community foreign policy can be increased.
The following study is designed to provide a basis for these reflections. It is divided into three parts, the first examining the conditions governing and the limits of parliamentary influence on political and treaty-based foreign relations, the second dealing with the current legal situation following the entry into force of the SEA and the problems arising therefrom, and the third discussing several models for the further development of the current law.
I. Bases

A. The Concept of a European Foreign Policy
The European Community's extensive legislative and policy-making powers are not confined to the Community's internal affairs. The Community is empowered and in a position to maintain relations with non-member countries and international organizations as well. It is a subject of international law. Several Treaty objectives provide expressly for such external activities. 1 The forms of the Community's activities in the field of foreign policy do not differ fundamentally from the instruments at the disposal of other subjects of inter-information and indirectly to control over the acts of that institution. Control may be restricted to reconstruction or review of acts. It may also include the grant of powers of rectification and the right to issue directives by means of which an institution exercises joint decision-making powers or the right to have the last say. The concept of control is used here in a wide sense to include both supervision and control.
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Control of the external acts of an organization can cover the following: -the substance and implementation of treaties governed by international law entered into by the organization; -the substance and implementation of autonomous measures adopted by the organization; -the formulation and enforcement of foreign policy principles; -membership of other international organizations and participation in conferences; -the conduct of bilateral and multilateral relations.
Democracy
Democratic control mechanisms are those which implement the characteristic principles of democratic systems. These consist first and foremost of the right of supervision and control exercised by an elected parliament, supplemented by procedures ensuring separation and limitation of powers, the legality of acts of the institution, and transparency and efficiency. 
C. Foreign Policy and Democratic Principles of the European Community
General
One of the fundamental and now formal requirements for membership in the European Community is observance of the 'principles of democracy ', 7 democracy being understood as 'parliamentary democracy '. 8 This means first of all the legislative power of a parliament elected by free, secret elections. 9 Democracy is not, however, a formal concept which can be restricted to individual aspects of sovereignty; it includes the control and supervision of the exercise of power. A democratic constitution is distinguished by the fact that it has at its disposal mechanisms binding all exercise of power on behalf or with the support of the organization to the consent of those affected or at any rate to their control.
This includes the 'institutionalization' of the exercise of power and the restriction, as regards time and nature, of individually granted negotiating powers. These objectives are achieved chiefly by assigning different roles to the institutions (separation of powers), by instituting checks and balances between the institutions and external control due to the public, transparent nature of decision-making procedures. In the interests of self-preservation, a democratic system also requires institutional arrangements enabling it to base its practical action on previously defined principles, in other words, to act purposively and thus efficiently. This is, inter alia, a justification for the principle of majority rule.
The balance necessary in each case between the consent of those affected on the one hand, and control of the power and efficiency of the system, on the other, can be reached in various ways and by various means. However, the principle of democracy applies overall. This means that particular areas of action, for example, foreign policy, cannot be made exempt in principle from the democratic legitimacy and control, one reason being that the internal and external acts of an organization or state are interlinked and cannot therefore be separated.
Above all, however, the two essential material objectives of foreign policy, to safeguard the existence of the system on the internal level and to enunciate principles on the external level, require constant direct legitimacy, which can be derived only from the consent of the governed. Without any parliamentary control or supcr-vision, the system's foreign policy is not sufficiently legitimate, thus endangering its stability.
Eighteenth and nineteenth-century European constitutional theory did not share this broad concept of democracy. The power to conduct foreign policy was regarded as belonging to the executive power to be exercised by the monarchy. 10 Despite the model of the combined action of the Senate and President developed by Hamilton and Jay for the United States Constitution, 11 European national constitutions were slow to involve parliaments in the shaping of foreign policy.
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The case-law of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which is described as being favourable to the executive authority and according to which the Bundestag only has foreign policy powers where the constitution has expressly conferred the subject-matter and content of such powers on parliament, is characteristic of the reserve which can still be seen in this day and age. 13 This view is no longer justified by reference to the rights reserved to the monarch but by the need for efficiency and consistency in foreign policy decision-making.
It is true that at first sight the fact that various institutions take part in the formulation and enunciation of foreign policy positions seems to constitute an obstacle to the clarity and feasibility, in other words, the efficiency, of foreign policy. However, complex systems such as the European Community can only formulate permanent objectives if the complexity of the situation is accounted for and incorporated in the decision-making process by means of a correspondingly specialized institutional system. In foreign policy matters, political consistency is often merely a fiction. The scope for change in foreign policy drawn up in legal instruments or formulated only at political level is one of the built-in factors in every political act. The more a political system allows of institutionalized formulation of varying options for the conduct of foreign policy, the more precisely can the importance of specific measures and attitudes be gauged, so that the range of variation itself be- comes a factor in foreign policy which enhances its dependability and thus its authority overall.
One of the building blocks of democratic systems is the scope for alternative action and thought As regards domestic policy, this is institutionally enshrined in the constitutions of democratic European states (the possibility of amending draft legislation, regular elections etc.). As far as foreign policy is concerned, this only applies to a limited extent In general this is justified by the special conditions surrounding foreign policy, which would allegedly preclude, to a large extent, its being made subject to parliamentary procedures.
14 The example of the combined action of the United States President and Senate shows, nevertheless, that it is perfectly possible for institutional changes to be made in the procedures for shaping foreign policy to enable parliament to participate. The efficiency of the conduct of foreign policy does not seem to be appreciably lessened provided that mechanisms exist which clearly determine the importance of the action of each institution for the organization as a whole and, in particular, enable coordination of the action of the various institutions in creating legally binding acts.
The specific capacity of action of institutions varies, however, on the basis of objective operating conditions, for example, the number of members. If these differences are taken into account when conferring powers on the institutions* each institution can represent, even in foreign affairs, an intrinsic value in their respective constitutional system. A parliament's main contribution to the shaping of foreign policy should therefore not be in matters requiring finesse, for example the negotiation of treaties. Nevertheless, it would be premature to deny a parliament on principle the power to negotiate treaties or to take other foreign policy measures. Even a parliament could entrust such tasks to a small group of people by means of internal specialization and make the outcome of negotiations subject to approval by the whole body. The foreign policy activities of governments can be regarded as an institutionalized specialization of this kind. The particular contribution of parliaments to the control and supervision of foreign policy lies, on the other hand, in the formulation of principles, the approval or rejection of the outcome of negotiations, and the monitoring of the activities of the executive.
In contrast to the policy making system within a state, democracy within the institutional structure and foreign policy making process of the EC suffers from a inter-institutional conflicts as well as from the tradition of autonomous foreign policy of the Member States. 15 relations, unlike national foreign relations, are not based on stage-by-stage agreement on a set of principles operating internally and represented externally, the demands placed on the capacity of the Community's institutional system to legitimate its foreign policy are appreciably greater.
As long as it is ensured that as many options as possible can be expressed during the policy formulation procedure and that that procedure enables a choice to be made between those options, the involvement of the various institutions, especially extensive cooperation on the part of the elected parliament, increases the legitimacy and thus in the long term the acceptance, both internally and externally, of foreign policy positions, which is a requirement of their feasibility. In addition, Parliament can exercise its institutionalized powers of supervision over the Commission and Council to control Community foreign policy. Parliament is, moreover, increasingly enunciating its foreign policy principles independently of the other institutions and also representing those principles vis-d-vis nonmember countries. This reveals a special feature of the Community's institutional system: the foreign policy activities of the Community institutions are not uniformly moulded by the political forces holding the majority at any given time. The composition of the various institutions bears no relation to the majorities in the European Parliament As a result, different foreign policy principles are given priority in the Council and Commission so that differences arise between the institutions which are not accounted for by political substructures and are for this reason revealed to the outside world as well. Precisely this independence enables the European Parliament to develop and put forward its own independent foreign policy attitude which, despite its limited feasibility in formal terms, is becoming an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy by the other institutions.
Control of European Foreign
Incidentally, the independence of the institutions is an important contribution to the transparency of the formulation of foreign policy objectives; it is thus an element which promotes democracy. Further details of the assent procedure are laid down in Articles 32 and 33 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure. Both provide for two debates to be held on association and accession agreements. One debate in plenary can be held before the negotiations take place. In the case of association agreements the debate is intended to result in an opinion on the negotiating mandate which the Council confers to the Commission. The second debate shall take place when the negotiations are completed but before any agreement is signed. This debate is concluded by the decision on the assent. The Treaty is less precise about the moment of Parliamentary assent because it requires the assent only to be given before the conclusion. The 'conclusion' may be determined either by the signature or by the exchange or deposit of the ratification instrument 32 A Parliamentary decision on the draft agreement at an earlier phase of the procedure lies still within the terms of Articles 237 and 238 EEC Treaty.
No deadline is specified for Parliament's assent pursuant to Articles 237 and 238 of the EEC Treaty. Contrary to consultation within the legislative procedure, which has to be concluded within a reasonable period, the veto power in the assent procedure means Parliament is free to choose die moment when to decide whether to give its assent to an application for accession or an association agreement forwarded by the Council. Until Parliament has explicitly given its assent, the Council may not accept an application for accession, nor may it conclude an association agreement For reasons of legal security Parliament may not effectively give its assent until the application or agreement concerned has been formally referred to it by the Council. On the other hand, the application or agreement is under referral to Parliament only until it has decided whether or not to give its assent If Parliament has refused to give its assent once, it can give it at a later date only if the Council resubmits to it the accession application or association agreement Parliament exercised its power of decision under Article 238 of the EEC Treaty for the first time on 16 September 1987, when it gave its assent for the conclusion of a total of 10 protocols to the association agreements with 5 states. 33 In December 1987, in protest at the arrest of a number of politicians in Turkey, Parliament postponed voting on whether to give its assent to two agreements between the Community and Turkey; 34 it eventually gave its assent in January 1988. 35 38 Within the context of the assent procedure it assumed fresh practical importance in terms of influence over the substance of the treaty negotiations, since the parliamentary committees responsible obtain not only information on the course of the negotiations but themselves make proposals with regard to substance which may be based on guidelines adopted by the Parliament before the negotiations began, using Parliament's power of holding debates on any topic which it considers important Parliament is only gradually discovering that the power attached to its right of assent can also be used to impose conditions only indirectly relating to the treaty itself. It laid down such conditions for the first time in the period preceding consultations on Austria's application for membership. In a resolution of February 1989 it stated that assent could be given to this application for membership only if the existing Member States first increased Parliament's rights. 39 Such package deals may appear unusual but are not in breach of the treaty because they are always less of a stumbling block than a refusal, which is permissible. 40 No definition of this notion is given but it seems to intend to cover mainly agreements based on Article 113. The 'significance' may in fact derive from either the political background or from its economic substance. Therefore also agreements which are concluded on the basis of secondary legislation, for example, fisheries agreements, could require consultation. 41 Since the extension of consultation results from an inter-institutional agreement, and since no procedure has been set to determine the nature of a given agreement, it appears to be up to the institutions to agree on whether the requirements for extended consultation are fulfilled. According to Parliament's internal rules (Art 34), it should be Parliament which decides whether any agreement is to be considered as 'significant'. Until the beginning of 1990 no such decision has been adopted by Parliament. Besides the -exceptional -institutional framework for Parliamentary control over the implementation of certain agreements, Parliament has unilaterally established a complex network of 'interparliamentary delegations which operate separately from specific agreements but which may exercise influence on their operation since it is implementation which is normally discussed when those delegations visit a given state.
Other Agreements
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Apart from this direct participation, Parliament uses its powers in the budgetary procedure and its general advisory and supervisory powers to influence indirectly the implementation of international agreements. 53 Most international agreements which contain precise financial obligations for the EC budget are considered as establishing compulsory expenditure.
54 Parliament can, in this respect, choose not to use its power of ultimate decision which Article 203 para. 6 EEC Treaty provides for noncompulsory expenditure. Many agreements establish, however, only a framework for measures with financial implications for the EC budget. Those expenses are to be considered as non-compulsory and require therefore Parliament's assent to the corresponding budgetary appropriations. Furthermore, Parliament's power to grant discharge to the Commission for the implementation of the budget provides an opportunity for scrutiny of financial aspects of the implementation. Parliament may re- In addition to this, Parliament's rights in the context of EPC are based on unilateral undertakings made by the Member States. 66 The European Parliament has the right to put questions to the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC corresponding to the right to question the Commission and the Council, the procedure for which is laid down in Rules 58-62 of the Rules of Procedure. 67 The Foreign Ministers also undertook to hold colloquies with Parliament's Political Affairs Committee twice yearly and, through its presidency, to report annually on EPC to Parliament, in plenary sitting and to submit the annual report in writing. In addition to this the Solemn Declaration on European Union of 19 June 1983 states that the presidency, at the beginning of its six-month term of office, will address the European Parliament and present its programme and report to it at the end of its term on the progress achieved. This had in fact already been the practice since 1973. Finally, the European Council -which is also competent in the field of EPC -agreed in 1981 to inform Parliament after each of its meetings in the form of a declaration in plenary.
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For several reasons these foreign policy activities of Parliament are of crucial importance as regards the democratic legitimacy of the international activities of the Community and its Member States. First of all, Parliament has never restricted its debates to the field delimited by the powers of external action laid down in the Community treaties. As long ago as 1961 the Heads of State and Government formally recognized, as requested by Parliament, its full power to debate foreign policy matters. 69 To an ever increasing extent, especially since the first direct elections in 1979, Parliament has regarded itself as a forum for debating European aspects of international political issues. In so doing it is enunciating its own views and estab- 
G. Interim Conclusions
Foreign policy activities are not in principle excluded from democratic control. On the contrary, foreign policy which has been shaped and legitimated democratically carries more weight in the outside world and strengthens the democratic structures internally. Although democratic control covers a large number of institutions and procedures, parliamentary involvement constitutes a necessary and indispensable requirement.
In so far as democratic control of European foreign policy is understood to mean parliamentary involvement, two levels of action can be basically envisaged and could be combined: national parliaments and the European Parliament However, the European Parliament alone is in a position and, moreover, has a democratic mandate by virtue of being directly elected, to formulate a viewpoint valid for the whole Community on a given issue. To be legitimate, the Community's foreign policy -solutions to inherent contradictions in the present EC procedures.
A considerable margin of evolution for an increased democratic control over foreign policy results from the flexibility of the decision-making procedure as laid down by the European Community Constitution. Modifications can be achieved both through changes in the present practice and by way of treaty amendments.
Scope for Expansion Requiring a Reform of the Treaties
(a) Parliament's right to give its assent to international treaties ought to be extended beyond the field of association agreements to all important agreements. In other words, instead of the formal criterion of 'association', a substantive criterion should be used for the purposes of identifying all agreements of an overwhelmingly technical nature for which parliamentary assent is not necessary. 
